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The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that no state, in enacting or enforcing any law, shall deprive any
person of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
Furthermore, the Fifth Amendment of the Bill of Rights provides a
similar protection against deprivation of "life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." 2 While the clauses mirror one another, the
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

The Fourteenth Amendment provides in relevant

part:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of laws.
Id.
Congress passed the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866, and the necessary number of
See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
states ratified it by 1868.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.2, at 357 (4th ed. 1991). Yet despite the amendment's broad
language, the Congressional testimony prior to its enactment was ambiguous, and the
Supreme Court was free to exercise broad discretion when interpreting the Amendment.
See id.at 357-58. Yet, the early Court decisions refused to provide such an expansive
reading when the Fourteenth Amendment was first challenged in the United States
Supreme Court. See generally Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
In these seminal cases, the Supreme Court determined that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to alter relations
between the state and federal governments. See id. at 78; see also Erwin Chemerinsky,
The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Unfulfilled Promise, 25 Loy.
L.A. L. REv. 1143, 1146 (1992) (noting that the Slaughter-House Court explained that
the Privileges and Immunities Clause "was not meant to change the relationship between
the federal and state governments or protect rights from state interference").
2 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides in full:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject
for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
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Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause is applicable to the federal
government, 3 while the Fourteenth Amendment's clause is binding on the
states.4 The5 Due Process Clauses, though providing little, if any, 6textual
The
explanation, are used extensively to protect individual rights.
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
Id.
The Fifth Amendment, part of the original Bill of Rights passed in 1791, protects a
number of individual rights, including the guarantee against "double jeopardy." See id.
The Court in North Carolina v. Pearce, stated that double jeopardy "protects against a
second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal[,] ... against a second
prosecution for the same offense after conviction[, and] ...against multiple punishments
for the same offense." 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969) (footnotes omitted); see also BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 491 (6th ed. 1990) (defining double jeopardy as protection "against
second prosecution for same offense after acquittal or conviction, and against multiple
punishments for same offense").
The Fifth Amendment also protects the right of an accused in a criminal trial to be
free from compelled self-incrimination. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. Generally, the
protection against self-incrimination is triggered whenever an accused's answers to
questions may be used by the government as evidence, or as leads to evidence, in future
criminal prosecutions. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERIcAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-

26, at 1021 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing privilege to be silent included in Fifth Amendment);
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1360 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "self-incrimination" as
prohibiting "the government from requiring a person to be a witness against himself
involuntarily or to furnish evidence against himself"); see also Garrity v. New Jersey,

385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967) (mandating that evidence coerced under threat of discharge
from public employment is constitutionally inadmissible); Albertson v. Subversive
Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70, 77-78 (1965) (striking down an order of the
Subversive Activities Board directing members of the Communist Party to admit
membership as a violation of the clause against self-incrimination, where the admission of
a Party member would be evidence in a prosecution against them).
Beyond these criminal protections, the Fifth Amendment requires the federal
government to provide "just compensation" when taking private land for public use. See
U.S. CONST. amend. V. The government must provide just compensation only when a
"taking" has occurred. See BLAK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1454 (6th ed. 1990) (defining a
"taking" as when a "government action directly interferes with or substantially disturbs
the owner's use and enjoyment of the property"). Yet the Court has struggled with the
issue of what constitutes a taking for constitutional purposes, and the term, "therefore, is
NOWAK &
best viewed not as a literal description of the governmental action."
ROTUNDA, supra note 1, § 11.12, at 444. In one commentator's view, a taking is
-constitutional law's expression for any sort of publicly inflicted private injury for which
the Constitution requires payment of compensation." Frank 1.Michelman, Property,
Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation"
Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1165 (1967).
See BLAK'S LAW DICTIONARY 611 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "federal government"

as a "system of government administered in a nation formed by the union or
confederation of several independent states").
4 See Sarah M. Bernstein, Note, Fourteenth Amendment-Police Failure to Preserve
Evidence and Erosion of the Due Process Right to a Fair Trial, 80 J. CRim. L. &
CRIM1NOLOGY 1256, 1263 (1990).
5 See, e.g., Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (recognizing the
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United States Supreme Court has recognized that these clauses contain
7
two distinct components: substantive due process and procedural due
process.8 Beyond these two concepts, however, the Supreme Court has
continually protected
fairness" doctrine. 9

individual

rights

through

the

"fundamental

right to "freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life"); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (recognizing that right to "privacy includes the abortion
decision"); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (recognizing a right of
privacy). But see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (declining to recognize
"a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy").
6 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191. The Supreme Court has recognized this dilemma:
It is true that despite the language of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments, which appears to focus only on the processes
by which life, liberty, or property is taken, the cases are legion in which
those Clauses have been interpreted to have substantive content, subsuming
rights that to a great extent are immune from federal or state regulation or
proscription. Among such cases are those recognizing rights that have
little or no textual support in the constitutionallanguage.
Id. (emphasis added).
See Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 1149. Under the doctrine of substantive due
process, the inquiry is centered on whether the state government is justified in enforcing
actions that infringe on rights deemed by the Supreme Court to be "fundamental," and
thereby under the protection of the Due Process Clause. See id. In this way, the
Supreme Court sets an outside constitutional limit on legislative action and preserves
individual freedoms. See Bernstein, supra note 4, at 1262.
The Supreme Court recognized the role of substantive due process, proclaiming in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey that "[i t is a promise of the Constitution that there is a
At the heart of
realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter....
liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe,
and of the mystery of human life." 505 U.S. 833, 847, 851 (1992). The Supreme Court,
however, has become increasingly reluctant to invoke the doctrine of substantive due
process because it is an area fraught with interpretational difficulty and prime for
improper judicial activity. See Albright v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807, 812 (1994) (plurality
opinion) (noting that " [t lhe protections of substantive due process have for the most part
been accorded to matters relating to marriage, family, procreation, and the right to bodily
inteirity").

See Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 1149. Procedural due process "delineates the
constitutional limits on judicial, executive, and administrative enforcement" of
governmental action or decisions. TRIBE, supra note 2, § 10-7, at 664; see also
Bernstein, supra note 4, at 1263 (stating that procedural due process defines the limits on
governmental actions). Traditionally, this guarantee has invoked procedural safeguards
designed to afford individuals an opportunity to be heard before they withstand substantial
loss resulting from governmental action. See TRIBE, supra note 2, at 664. Also, the
protection focuses on whether the government has complied with appropriate procedures
before taking an individual's life, liberty, or property. See Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at
1151-52.
9 See Bernstein, supra note 4, at 1264-65.
Established in the late Nineteenth
Century, the doctrine is important in that "fundamental fairness has become the
touchstone of due process." Michael T. Fisher, Note, Harmless Error, Prosecutorial
Misconduct, and Due Process: There's More to Due Process than the Bottom Line, 88
COLUM. L. REv. 1298, 1300 (1988).
The fundamental fairness doctrine has two branches. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE &
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Among the most fundamental of rights guaranteed by the Due

Process Clauses is an individual's right to a fair trial. 10 To this end, due
process mandates that the procedures utilized in a criminal proceeding

comply with notions of justice and fair play."

One of the significant

protections afforded by due process concerns the doctrine whereby a

defendant may not be tried when found to be mentally incompetent to
stand trial.' 2 Yet despite its importance to the criminal process, mental
JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 2.4, at 52 (2d ed. 1992). The first prong
advances the notion that any state action that invades fundamental individual rights is
prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.
See id; see also
Bernstein, supra note 4, at 1264-65. The second and distinct prong of fundamental
fairness advocates that the Bill of Rights is distinct from the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra, § 2.4, at 53; Bernstein, supra
note 4, at 1265. In other words, this second prong maintains that "[tlhe concept of due
process has 'an independent potency' which exists apart from the Bill of Rights, although
in a particular case it may afford protection that parallels a Bill of Rights guarantee."
LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra, § 2.4, at 53. While the Court still applies this doctrine, the
traditional demarcation between it and the "selective incorporation" doctrine has been
increasingly blurred, especially in light of each doctrine's rationales. See id.
After the 1920s, the Supreme Court, applying the fundamental fairness doctrine,
expanded the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause to include
the protections of the Bill of Rights as applied to state criminal procedures.
See
Bernstein, supra note 4, at 1265. For example, in Duncan v. Louisiana, the Court held
that the right to a fair trial is "fundamental to the American scheme of justice." 391 U.S.
145, 149 (1968). The fundamental fairness test "'meant that the Court would be willing
to enforce values which the justices saw as having a special importance in the
development of individual liberty in American society, whether or not the value was one
that was theoretically necessary in any system of democratic government.'" Bernstein,
supra note 4, at 1266 (quoting 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA ET AL., TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 15.6, at 75 (1986)). Currently, a
majority of the Bill of Rights protections applicable to the criminal process are included
under the umbrella of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. As a result, most of the
criminal protections afforded by the Bill of Rights are equally applicable in both federal
and state actions. See id.
10 See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 61 (1988) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting)
("The Constitution requires that criminal defendants be provided with a fair trial, not
merely a 'good faith' try at a fair trial.").
11 See Fisher, supra note 9, at 1299. Due process is supremely
significant to the
operation of a criminal justice system designed to effectively enforce "the criminal law
through the detection, apprehension, conviction, and punishment of guilty persons." Id.
(quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.6, at 37
(1984)). Among the most significant goals of the criminal process are "the maintenance
of the adversarial and accusatorial systems, the assurance of respect for the individual
dignity, the minimization of erroneous convictions, the appearance of fairness, and the
equal protection of the law." Id. at 1300 (footnotes omitted). These processes further
strive to guarantee that justice be served in criminal proceedings through a correct
outcome that is achieved through fair procedures. See id.
12 See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (noting that
it has "long been
accepted" that an incompetent defendant cannot be put to trial). For a discussion of
common-law traditions of competency evaluations, see also infra notes 134-55 and
accompanying text. A trial of an incompetent defendant "cannot be fair and is apt to be
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incompetence may be one of the concepts most misunderstood by the
public, attorneys, judges, and even mental health professionals. 1 As a
result, it is difficult for courts to draw distinct lines when ruling in
14
incompetency cases, and the decision is often fact-sensitive.
unreliable." JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 25.02, at 290 (1987).
An incompetent defendant would likely be unable to effectively assist his counsel,
confront his accusers, and rationally testify at trial on his own behalf. See id.
The American Law Institute believes that some of the traditional rationales
underlying the punishment of criminal offenders, like retribution, may be frustrated when
the defendant is unable to understand the proceedings against him. See MODEL PENAL
Similarly, a desire for accuracy in criminal
CODE § 4.04 cmt., at 230 n.1 (1985).
proceedings and other public policy rationales underlie the requirement of competency to
stand trial. See PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 208, at 503 (1984); see
also infra note 66 (discussing current incompetency standards); infra notes 157-61 and
accompanying text (discussing current incompetency burdens).
13 See ABA

JUSTICE,

STANDING

COMMITTEE OF ASSOCIATION STANDARDS

CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS,

FOR CRIMINAL
7-139 (First Tentative Draft,

July 1983). While similar in theory to the defense of insanity at the time of a criminal
offense, incompetency to stand trial is a separate and distinct issue in purpose, in the test
to be applied, in the procedural protections mandated by due process, and in its effect
upon defendants. See id. Simply, the insanity defense, or a verdict of not guilty by
reason of insanity (NGRI) is traditionally considered "'insanity at the time of the
offense,'" and serves to excuse one's criminal conduct, while incompetence to stand trial
is considered "'insanity at the time of trial.'" Id. (footnote omitted); see also ROBINSON,
supra note 12, § 208, at 501 (stating that the insanity defense "considers the defendant's
mental capacity at the time of the offense and serves to fully exculpate the defendant for
his conduct" while an incompetency finding serves "simply to bar his trial"). Also, a
finding of incompetency does not usually result in the defendant's release, but rather in
his commitment to a mental facility. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 731 (1972).
Yet the Supreme Court has held that due process is violated when a criminal defendant is
committed indefinitely solely on the basis of his incompetency to stand trial. See id. at
738.

One of the most significant distinctions between an incompetency finding and a
verdict of NGRI is that the defendant in an NGRI is "assumed" to have committed the
criminal action at issue, but the incompetent defendant is never even "put to trial" on the
criminal charge. See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 363 (1983) (noting that a
NGRI verdict establishes, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed a
criminal act and that she or he committed the act because of mental illness).
For an in-depth and well-researched discussion of the NGRI acquitees as opposed to
incompetent defendants, see generally John Kip Cornwell, Confining Mentally Disordered
"Super-Criminals": A Realignment of Rights in the Nineties, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 651
(1996). Professor Cornwell notes that a state has a legitimate interest in protecting
society from dangerous incompetent defendants "suspected" of committing crimes. See
id. at 683. But see generally Robert A. Burt & Norval Morris, A Proposalfor the
Abolition of the Incompetency Plea, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 66 (1972) (advocating the
comnlete abolition of the incompetency plea).
See, e.g., United States v. Barnes, 30 F.3d 575, 577 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding that a
defendant's inability to communicate in front of a large group of people did not make him
incompetent to stand trial); United States v. Chischilly, 30 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir.
1994) (finding that the defense's expert testimony was outweighed by the government's
expert testimony); United States v. Ecker, 30 F.3d 966, 969 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding that
an incompetency hearing held four years after the start of trial was not so long as to be
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In Cooper v. Oklahoma,15 the United States Supreme Court
entertained a due process challenge to a state statute 16 placing a burden of
clear and convincing evidence upon a defendant seeking to prove his
incompetence to stand trial. 17 The Court, in a unanimous decision, held
that such a standard violated the defendant's guarantee of due process. 1

In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that neither history nor
current yractice in a majority of jurisdictions supported a heightened
burden,
and that a clear and convincing evidence standard did not
guarantee "fundamental fairness" to the criminal defendant. 20 Therefore,

the Court mandated that while a state may choose to place the burden of
proving incompetency upon the defendant, it can require a standard no

higher than a preponderance of the evidence.2
In 1989, a jury in the District Court of Oklahoma County,
Oklahoma, found defendant Byron Keith Cooper (Cooper) guilty of firstdegree murder. 22 After finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Cooper
had killed eighty-six-year-old Harold Sheppard during a burglary, 23 and
unreasonable).
See generally Richard A. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal
Defendants: Beyond Dusky and Drope, 47 U. MiAMi L. REV. 539 (1993); Bruce J.
Winnick, Presumptions and Burdens of Proof in Determining Competency to Stand Trial:
An Analysis of Medina v. California and the Supreme Court's New Due Process
Methodology in Criminal Cases, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 817 (1993); Stacey A. Giulianti,
Comment, The Right to Proceed Pro Se at Competency Hearings: PracticalSolutions to
a Constitutional Catch-22, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 883 (1993).
15 116 S. Ct. 1373 (1996).
16 See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1175.4(B) (West Supp. 1996),
amended by 1996
Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 161 (West); infra note 43.
17 See Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at 1374-75. It is likely impossible to precisely
delineate at
what point evidence becomes "clear and convincing," as can be seen by Black's Law
Dictionary'sattempt to define clear and convincing proof. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
251 (6th ed. 1990). Black's defines this term as "proof which results in reasonable
certainty of the truth of the ultimate fact in controversy," and "[plroof which requires
more than a preponderance of the evidence but less than proof beyond a reasonable
doubt." Id.
15 See Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at 1384.
19 See id. at 1377-80.
20 See id. at 1380.
21 See id. at 1377; see also BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1182 (6th ed. 1990) (defining
preponderance of the evidence" as "evidence which is of greater weight or more
convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it" and "evidence which as
a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not").
22 See Cooper v. State, 889 P.2d 293, 298 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995), rev'd,
116 S.
Ct. 1373 (1996).
23 See id. On September 5, the day after Sheppard was murdered, Cooper used
the
deceased's credit card to purchase two gold watches. See id. The teller, suspicious
because Cooper "did not look like the kind of customer to whom [J.C. Penney's] would
issue a credit card," called the authorities and provided them with a composite drawing.
See id. This drawing helped police spot Cooper two weeks later, and after a short chase,
the authorities apprehended him. See id.
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that certain aggravating factors were present,2 4 the trial court imposed the
death penalty.

On five occasions, the trial court questioned Cooper's competence:
each time the judge considered whether Cooper was able to understand
the charges against him and to aid in his own defense.2 6 On the first
occasion, the judge relied on a single opinion given by a state-employed
clinical psychologist. 2 7 After Cooper completed a three-month stay at a
mental health hospital, his attorney offered additional testimony as to his

Initially, Cooper claimed to have murdered Sheppard and another woman, but later
in the interrogation he retracted the admissions. See id. Cooper denied being at the
crime scene, even though police had not told him the address, but finally admitted that he
may have committed the murders, but that he "could not remember." See id. at 298-99.
During the investigation police uncovered evidence of Sheppard's hair and a gold
watch at Cooper's apartment and found the defendant's fingerprints on items in the
Sheppard residence. See id. at 299.
Additionally, blood found at the crime scene
matched Cooper's, and cigarettes of the type Cooper smoked were recovered from the
scene. See id. While Cooper could not explain how these items came to be in the
deceased's home, he did tell police that "if he had killed the man, his prints should have
been found on the weapon, and he was certain they would not be." Id. Cooper's
prophesy came true in that the police found no prints on the murder weapon. See id.
Science cut short Cooper's career as a prophet, however, when a chemical sprayed on the
knife revealed "swipe marks which would be exhibited if blood on the blade had been
wiped off." Id.
See id. at 298. The jury found five aggravating factors: Cooper
had previously
been convicted of a felony involving violence; the murder was "especially heinous,
atrocious and cruel"; the murder was committed to avoid arrest; the murder was
committed while Cooper was serving a sentence for a prior felony conviction; and
Coo7er posed a continuing threat to society. See id.
See id.
26 See Cooper v. Oklahoma, 116 S. Ct. 1373, 1375 (1996). The Oklahoma trial
court
applied its statutory standard, which mirrored the minimal constitutional standard for
competency as laid out by the Supreme Court in Dusky v. United States. See id.; see also
Dusky, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam).
The Dusky Court held that an
incompetency "test must [ask] whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding-and whether
he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him."
Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at 1375; see also infra notes 60-66 and accompanying text (discussing
the Dusky decision).
27 See Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at 1375. The state psychologist, Dr. Edith
King, testified
before the trial court that she believed Cooper was incompetent when she originally
examined him, but that he may be malingering.
See Cooper, 889 P.2d at 303.
Furthermore, she testified that Cooper indicated on at least four occasions during his
evaluation that he seemed to understand the charges against him, was aware of the
consequences he faced if convicted, and expressed an interest in pleading insanity. See
id. Cooper was also reported in the record to have stated, "ly]ou're wasting your time
going over courtroom proceedings with me. I know them.
I've already spent 10
calendar years behind bars," and "I've got nothing to lose, I've already got two murder
raps on me." Id. at 303-04. Based on this testimony, the trial judge committed Cooper
to a state mental health facility at Vinita for treatment. See id. at 303.
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mental state. 28 While this information provided conflicting evidence as to
whether Cooper would be able to participate in his own defense, 29 the
trial judge ruled against the defendant for a second time, instructing
Cooper to proceed with his trial."
One week before the trial was to begin, Cooper's attorney once

again questioned Cooper's competence. 3 The attorney noted that he was
32

behaving oddly and that Cooper refused to communicate with him.
Still, however, the trial judge declined to retract his previous
determination. 33

On the first day of Cooper's trial, his spasmodic behavior induced
the court to conduct a competency hearing. 3 4 At the hearing, the judge
personally observed the defendant and heard testimony from a lay
witness, a third expert psychologist, and Cooper himself.35 While the
28 See Cooper, 889 P.2d at 304.
29 See id.

30 See Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at 1375.
31 See id.

32 See id. The respondent's and petitioner's briefs show evidence of Cooper's bizarre
activity. See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioner at *5, Cooper v. Oklahoma, 116 S. Ct. 1373
(1996) (No. 95-5207) (available in 1995 WL 694355) [hereinafter Petitioner's Brief]
(explaining that Cooper "insisted his mother had died a long time ago[,]" which
"obviously was not true, as his mother testified during the penalty phase of the trial[,"
made a drawing of "'Noryb,' a spirit with whom Mr. Cooper claimed to communicate [,
and he] lapsed into unintelligible speech").
33 See Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at 1375.
34 See id. Cooper refused to change out of his prison suit because the suit the county
offered was "burning" him. See id. n.1. Furthermore, Cooper talked to himself and to
an "imaginary 'spirit'" he claimed gave him counsel. See id. While on the witness
stand, Cooper confessed his fear that his lead lawyer wanted to kill him. See id. Finally,
the head counsel noted during his closing arguments to the court that any time he tried to
get close to Cooper when he was on the witness stand:
he would stand up and he would get away from me as far as he could....
So I've approached him from every side... except I haven't approached
him from the front. So yesterday, I approach him from the front. And
that's the last thing I did ....
[Cooper] stood up and he got as far back
against the rail behind the witness chair as he could get. I edged closer.
He got as far back and he got up on that rail. So I've got him up on the
rail and I'm thinking, hey, what can I lose? ... [W]ithout looking for his
safety at all and looking what's behind him, when I moved the least bit
.•.he fell to get away from me.... He hit his head. The thud on that
marble when he jackknifed backward off of that railing into that marble
could be heard at the back of the courtroom ....
Id.; see also Petitioner's Brief, supra note 32, at *5 (stating that Cooper became "so
paranoid and distraught during the questioning ... that as defense counsel approached
him, he backed up out of the witness chair and fell backwards over the railing, jackknifed
between the witness box and the wall, striking his head against the marble wall").
35 See Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at 1375. Cooper failed to respond to a majority of
questioning on the stand, but when he did respond he indicated that his counsel was
trying to kill him, and he accused his lawyer, the prosecutor, and others of trying to
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expert concluded that Cooper was presently incompetent and could not
communicate with his lawyers, the expert believed Cooper would likely

attain competency if subjected to an aggressive program of treatment.
Even with this testimony, the trial judge ruled against Cooper.37
As the trial progressed, Cooper exhibited more bizarre behavior
consistent with the expert's testimony provided at the prior hearing.3 8

The defense attorney offered even more evidence of Cooper's mental
state during the sentencing phase by disclosing details of Cooper's40
troubled childhood. 39 Finally, the defense counsel moved for a mistrial
choke him with a rope. See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 32, at *5.
36 See Cooper v. State, 889 P.2d 293, 304 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995), rev'd, 116 S.
Ct. 1373 (1996). Dr. Philip Murphy testified for the defense that while Cooper may have
been a "world-class, first-class manipulator," he had a mental mood disorder that would
keep him from communicating with his counsel. See id. Dr. Murphy further testified
that Cooper might improve if given "aggressive" treatment, including doses of an antianxiety medication. See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 32, at *9.
There was also lay testimony from inmates who had spent time with Cooper while he
was in holding. See Cooper, 889 P.2d at 304. They testified that "he compulsively and
continually cleaned his cell; played with his feces, smearing it on his face; and talked to
himself or to thin air." Id. This was disputed, however, by the inmates who testified for
the state. See id. The prosecution's evidence showed that Cooper had communicated
normally with other inmates, and had appeared to understand the contents of two pro se
complaints he had filed in 1991 and 1992. See id.
See Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at 1375. While the judge did not dispute the evidence, he
stated that his "shirtsleeve opinion of Mr. Cooper is that he's not normal." Id. at 1376.
But, "to say he's not competent is something else.... I don't believe he has carried the
burden by clear and convincing evidence of his incompetency." Id.
38 See id. Cooper did not sit near, or talk to, his counsel, and he often remained
in
the fetal position talking to himself. See id. n.2. Further, near the end of the State's
evidence, a deputy accompanying Cooper "notified the trial judge there was 'a real heavy
odor of feces in the area' and Cooper appeared to have feces in his hand. Both the bailiff
and the deputy had seen [Cooper] eating feces."
Petitioner's Brief, supra note 32, at
*10. Luckily, the court ordered a recess so the deputies could remove the feces, which
"'looked like candy,'" from Cooper's hand. See Brief for Respondent at *11, Cooper v.
Oklahoma, 116 S. Ct. 1373 (1996) (No. 95-5207) (available in 1995 WL 739592)
[hereinafter Respondent's Brief].
39 See Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at 1376. Cooper's brief
paints a painful portrait of a
person persecuted "virtually from birth at the hands of those under a duty to protect him:
his family, foster homes, and the justice system." Petitioner's Brief, supra note 32, at
*11. Cooper's
brother, older sister, uncle, grandmother, and great-aunt testified in great
detail to Cooper's childhood, although . . . "they didn't have very much of
a childhood" because they didn't have a father, and only "about a third of
a mother." Their mother was an alcoholic and had been diagnosed with
schizophrenia. Their great-aunt observed that when the children were
small, "[tlhey lived like animals."
That is, they never had food or
supervision and they begged for food. There were times when there was
no water, electricity or gas in the house. Even when their mother was
working... there were times when the family had no food in the
refrigerator, only Boone's Farm Liquor.
Id. n.7. Unfortunately for Cooper and his siblings, their mother came home once in a
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competence. 4 1
or, alternatively, for a renewed investigation into Cooper's
death.
to
Cooper
The court denied these motions and sentenced
Cooper appealed to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals,

contending that the Oklahoma presumption of competence, in unison with

the statutory requirement 43 that Cooper establish his incompetence by
clear and convincing evidence, 44 violated his fundamental right to due
process of law under the Fifth 45 and Fourteenth 46 Amendments. 47 Before
while, and "she regularly beat them with her hands, and items such as brooms, a
hammer, extension cords, a candle holder, and shoes; she even pulled knives on them,
and on one occasion shot at them." Id. at *11.
Cooper received the worst beatings of all, because "he looked most like their dad[,]"
and on one occasion, his mother "beat him with a baseball bat until he could not move."
Id. When Cooper was small, he was moved briefly to a foster home, where he was
forced to "sleep in the geese pens." Id. at *12. By the age of four, and after a stint in a
state-run home where he was told his parents had died in a car wreck, Cooper was back
with his mother and her new husband. See id.While the husband was a good father to
Cooper and his siblings, he was shot dead by his new bride in 1974, when Cooper was
only 11. See id. From then on, Cooper spent the rest of his formative years in either
boys' homes or penitentiaries. See id. at *12-13.
See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 651 (West 1988) (stating that a new
trial can be
granted, "after a verdict by the jury ...on the application of the aggrieved party" when
certain events materially affect "the substantial rights of [the aggrieved] party"); see also
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1002 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "mistrial" as "[ain erroneous,
invalid, or nugatory trial" and "[a] device used to halt trial proceedings when error is so
prejudicial and fundamental that expenditure of further time and expense would be
wasteful if not futile").
41 See Cooper, 116 S. Ct.
at 1376.
42 See id.

43 See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1175.4(B) (West Supp. 1996),
amended by 1996
Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 161 (West). The statute provides in relevant part:
The court, at the hearing on the application [for determination of
competency], shall determine, by clear and convincing evidence, if the
person is incompetent. The person shall be presumed to be competent for
the purposes of the allocation of the burden of proof and burden of going
forward with the evidence.
Id. A hearing under § 1175 can be held before a jury of six persons. See id.
Additionally, the defendant has the right to be present at the § 1175 hearing, unless it is
shown by clear and convincing evidence that his presence would be disruptive. See id. §
1175.4(C) (West 1986 & Supp. 1996). Furthermore, the defendant is afforded many
procedural protections natural to the criminal trial process, such as the right to crossexamine witnesses. See id. § 1175.4(D).
4 See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 1175.4(B) (West Supp. 1996), amended by
1996
Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 161 (West).
45 See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person
shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Id.
Through this doctrine of "selective incorporation" the Court has applied almost all of the
protections of the Bill of Rights, including the Fifth Amendment, to the states. See, e.g.,
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969) (incorporating the freedom from double
jeopardy); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (incorporating the right to
trial before a jury); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222 (1967) (incorporating
the right to a speedy trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965) (incorporating the

1997]

NOTE

745

the appellate court, Cooper argued that the clear and convincing standard
right to confront witnesses); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (incorporating the
right to be free from compelled self-incrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,
342-44 (1963) (incorporating the right to counsel); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660,
667 (1962) (incorporating the right to be free of cruel and unusual punishments); Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (incorporating the right to exclude illegally-seized
evidence from criminal trials); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949)
(incorporating the right to freedom from unreasonable search and seizure); In re Oliver,
333 U.S. 257, 278 (1948) (incorporating the right to a public trial); Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (incorporating the protection against establishment of
religion); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (incorporating the right to
free exercise of religion); Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 512 (1939)
(incorporating the right to petition for grievances); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353,
365-66 (1937) (incorporating the right to assembly); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697,
707 (1931) (incorporating the right to free press); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 387
(1927) (incorporating the right to free speech); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v.
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236 (1897) (incorporating the right to just compensation). "The
only provisions of the first eight amendments that have not been incorporated are the
second and third amendments, the fifth amendment's requirement of grand jury
indictment, and the seventh amendment." GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 784 (3d ed. 1991).
Technically, the Bill of Rights is still not directly applicable to the states, but the
protections, such as the First Amendment guaranty of freedom of speech, are made
applicable through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. See TRIBE, supra
note 2, § 11-2, at 772. The Court, therefore, looks to the Bill of Rights as "points of
reference only." Id. at 773 n.25. In the majority of cases, the Court applies the same
constitutional standard to state and federal governments when an incorporated protection
is involved, even though "the congruence is not invariably perfect." Id. (citations
omitted).
In determining whether a protection found in the Bill of Rights is applicable through
selective incorporation, the Court has asked whether the right is among those
"fundamental to the American scheme of justice." Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149; see also
Gideon, 372 U.S. at 343-44 (asking whether a criminal right is "essential to a free trial");
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 273 (asking whether a right is "basic in our system of
jurisprudence"); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932) (asking whether a right is
among the "fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our
civil and political institutions"). But see NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 1, § 11.6, at
385 (claiming that "[tihe preponderance of historical evidence.., indicates that the
drafters of the [Fourteenth] [Almendment did not specifically intend to apply all of [the
Bill of Rights] to the states") (footnote omitted).
46 See U.S. CONST. amend XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment provides
that "[nlo
state shall .. .deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law." Nowak and Rotunda note that the Due Process Clauses protect both procedural
and substantive rights. See NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 1, § 10.6, at 338-39.
Procedural due process is limited, guaranteeing only that the government will provide a
fair decision-making process before acting to affect an individual's life, liberty, or
property. See id. at 339. Substantive due process, by contrast, determines the
compatibility of the substance of a governmental action with that action's underlying
constitutionality. See id.

47 See Cooper v. State, 889 P.2d 293, 299 (1995), rev'd,
116 S. Ct. 1373 (1996).
Beyond his constitutional arguments concerning Oklahoma's statutory standards, Cooper
also challenged, inter alia, jury instructions, the competency of his attorney, and other
aspects of his trial. See id.at 305-18.
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was unduly harsh under United States Supreme Court jurisprudence,
relying on decisions such as Medina v. California48 and Addington v.

Texas, 49 because it offended a "principle of justice so rooted in the
traditions

and50 conscience

fundamental. "

of our

people

as

to

be

ranked

as

In rejecting Cooper's argument and affirming his sentence, the
appellate court noted that it may be difficult to ascertain whether a
defendant is feigning incompetency, given "the inexactness and

uncertainty attached to [competency] proceedings.", 51 The court noted
that the standard was justified because Oklahoma's interest in assuring an
efficient judiciary was considerable and because a "truly incompetent
defendant, through 5 his
attorneys and experts, can prove incompetency
2
ease."
relative
with
Having exhausted his state court remedies, 53 Cooper appealed to the
United States Supreme Court, which granted Cooper's petition for
certiorari.5 4 The Court granted Cooper an appeal to determine whether
the standard of clear and convincing evidence, when placed on a

48

505 U.S. 437 (1992); see infra notes 88-101 and accompanying text (discussing the

Court's disposition of Medina).
49 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
50 "Cooper, 889 P.2d at 303 (quoting Medina, 505 U.S. at 445 (quoting Patterson
v.
New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977))) (internal quotation marks omitted).
51 Id. at 302-03. The court understood the conflicting competency testimony "to
illustrate the inexactness and uncertainty attached to proceedings of this nature,
proceedings based on diagnoses which are to a large extent based on medical impressions
drawn from subjective analysis...." Id. at 303 (quoting Medina, 505 U.S. at 451
(quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 430 (1979))) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
52 Id. The appellate court emphasized that "[tlhe State has great interest in assuring
its citizens a thorough and speedy judicial process, together with the presumption of
competency which is historically based on our law." Id.
See generally OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4. The Oklahoma Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction is "coextensive with the State and [extends] to all cases at law and in
equity," except in criminal cases, where the Court of Criminal Appeals has "exclusive
appellate jurisdiction" unless provided for by statute. Id.; see also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
20, § 40 (West 1991) (providing that the "Court of Criminal Appeals shall have exclusive
appellate jurisdiction... in all criminal cases appealed from" the lower courts); id. tit.
22, § 1080 (West 1986) (stating that the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act entitles a
defendant to challenge a criminal conviction to the Court of Criminal Appeals). Cooper
also had a statutory right to appeal his conviction under Oklahoma criminal procedure
because the State imposed capital punishment. See OKLA. CRiM. P. R. 9.4.
54 See Cooper v. Oklahoma, 116 S. Ct. 282 (1995).
The Supreme Court later
granted numerous organizations leave to file amicus curiae briefs. See, e.g., Cooper v.
Oklahoma, 116 S.Ct. 671 (1995) (granting leave to the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers); Cooper v. Oklahoma, 116 S. Ct. 562 (1995) (granting leave to the
American Association on Mental Retardation).
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defendant53 seeking to prove his incompetency to stand trial, violated due
process.
The Court reversed the decision of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals and held that a standard of clear and convincing evidence, when
imposed upon a defendant seeking to prove his incompetence to stand
trial, violated due process. 56 The Court, in reaching its decision,
concluded that the State's heightened standard was supported by neither
historical practice nor by the majority of contemporary jurisdictions. 57
Furthermore, the Court decided that a preponderance of the evidence
standard better exhibited "fundamental fairness" in operation. 58
The Supreme Court has long viewed a defendant's right to be tried
only when competent as a fundamental guarantee of the Constitution's
Due Process Clauses.5 9 The Court considered what the appropriate test
should be in Dusky v. United States,60 where the trial court held hearings
6
to determine whether a defendant was in fact competent to stand trial.
The defendant in Dusky was convicted of unlawfully transporting in
Reviewing the
interstate commerce a girl who had been kidnapped.
district court's application of the federal statutory standard for
63
incompetency proceedings, the Court held that the evidence did not
64
The
support a determination that Dusky was competent to stand trial.
Court found that it was not constitutionally sufficient for a district judge
conducting an incompetency hearing to determine whether a defendant
65
"is oriented to time and place and [has] some recollection of events."
Instead, the Court held that the proper standard in incompetency
proceedings was "whether [the defendant] ha[d] sufficient present ability
to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
as well as factual
understanding-and whether he ha[d] a rational
66
understanding of the proceedings against him."
55 See Cooper v. Oklahoma, 116 S. Ct. 1373, 1374-75 (1996).
56 See id. at 1384.

See id. at 1377-80.
58 See id. at 1383.
59 See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (noting that "it has long been
accuted" that an incompetent defendant cannot be put to trial).
6 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam).
61 See id. at 402.
62 See Dusky v. United States, 271 F.2d 385, 390 (8th Cir. 1959). Dusky was

convicted of kidnapping in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Missouri for picking up a 15-year-old girl in Missouri and bringing her into Kansas with
the intent to rape her. See id. at 386-87, 390.
63 See 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) (1988).
See Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
66 Id. Today, 37 jurisdictions have enacted statutes mirroring the Dusky standard.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[27:735

See 1996 Alaska Sess. Laws 62 (defining an incompetent defendant as one unable to
understand the proceedings or to assist in his or her defense); ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 11.1
(same); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-302 (Michie 1993) (same); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1367(a)
(West Supp. 1996) (same); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-8-102(3) (West 1990) (same);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 404(a) (1995) (same); D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(a) (1996)
(same); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 916.12 (West 1996) (same); HAW. REV. STAT. § 704-403
(1993) (same); IDAHO CODE § 18-210 (1987) (same); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/10410 (West 1992) (same); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-3-1(a) (West Supp. 1996) (defining an
incompetent defendant as one unable to understand the proceedings and to assist in his or
her defense); IOWA CODE ANN. § 812.3 (West 1994) (defining an incompetent defendant
as one unable to understand the proceedings or to assist in his or her defense); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 22-3301(1)(a)-(b) (1995) (same); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 504.060(4)
(Michie Supp. 1996) (same); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 641 (West 1981) (same);
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 12-101(e)(1)-(2) (1994) (same); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 330.2020(1) (West 1992) (same); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 20.01, subd. 1(1)-(2)
(same); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 552.020(1) (West Supp. 1996) (same); MONT. CODE ANN. §
46-14-103 (1995) (same); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 178.400(2) (Michie Supp. 1995)
(defining an incompetent defendant as one unable to understand the proceedings and to
assist in his or her defense); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-4(a) (West 1995) (defining an
incompetent defendant as one unable to understand the proceedings or to assist in his or
her defense); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 730.10(1) (McKinney 1995) (same); N.C. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 15A-1001(a) (1988) (same); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-04-04 (1985)
(same); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.37(A) (Anderson 1996) (same); OR. REV. STAT. §
161.360(2)(a)-(c) (1995) (same); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-23-410 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1995)
(same); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-IOA-1 (Michie Supp. 1996) (same); TEX. CRIM. P.
CODE ANN. § 46.02(1)(a)(1)-(2) (West 1979) (same); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-15-2(1)-(2)
(1995) (same); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-169.1(D) (Michie 1995) (defining an incompetent
defendant as one unable to understand the proceedings and to assist in his or her
defense); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.77.010(6) (West Supp. 1997) (defining an
incompetent defendant as one unable to understand the proceedings or to assist in his or
her defense); W. VA. CODE § 27-6A-2(b) (1992) (defining an incompetent defendant as
one unable to understand the proceedings and to assist in his or her defense); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 971.13(1) (West 1985) (defining an incompetent defendant as one unable to
understand the proceedings or to assist in his or her defense).
Interestingly, Wyoming provides additional requirements for a finding of
incompetency through its statutory standards that nonetheless reflect the Dusky holding.
See Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-11-302(a)(i)-(iv) (Michie 1995). For instance, Wyoming
defines an incompetent defendant as one who is unable, because of mental illness or
deficiency, to: "(i) Comprehend his position; (ii) Understand the nature and object of the
proceedings against him; (iii) Conduct his defense in a rational manner; and (iv)
Cooperate with his counsel to the end that any available defense may be interposed." Id.
While some states do not specifically define a Dusky standard through statute, they
often adopt the standard through their court systems. See, e.g., Bailey v. State, 421 So.
2d 1364, 1366 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982) (determining that an incompetent defendant is one
unable to understand the proceedings and to assist in his or her defense); Banks v. State,
269 S.E.2d 450, 453 (Ga. 1980) (same); State v. Lewis, 584 A.2d 622, 624 (Me. 1990)
(same); Commonwealth v. Prater, 651 N.E.2d 833, 837 (Mass. 1995) (same); Gammage
v. State, 510 So. 2d 802, 803 (Miss. 1987) (determining that an incompetent defendant is
one unable to understand the proceedings or to assist in his or her defense); State v.
Chapman, 721 P.2d 392, 397 (N.M. 1986) (determining that an incompetent defendant is
one unable to understand the proceedings and to assist in his or her defense); Berndt v.
State, 733 S.W.2d 119, 123 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987) (same).
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The Supreme Court next addressed the issue of incompetent
defendants in Pate v. Robinson.6 7 The Pate case traveled twice to the
Supreme Court, first as an appeal from the Illinois Supreme Court6" and

then as an appeal from the denial of a federal habeas corpus petition.69
383 U.S. 375 (1966).
68 See People v. Robinson, 174 N.E.2d 820, 823 (IUI. 1961), cert. denied sub nom.
67

Pate v. Robinson, 368 U.S. 995 (1962) (upholding conviction where evidence failed to
raise sufficient doubt as to defendant's sanity at the time of criminal offense). The
defendant was originally convicted in 1959 of murdering his common-law wife, Flossie
May Ward, and sentenced to life imprisonment. See Pate, 383 U.S. at 376.
The defense produced evidence at Robinson's murder trial that suggested that he had
a long history of mental and behavioral problems. See id. at 378-84. When he was seven
or eight, Robinson was hit on the head by a brick dropped from a third floor window, and
thereafter, in the words of his mother, "'he acted a little peculiar.'" See id. at 378. After
continual erratic behavior as a child and young adult, including periods of violence, he
was placed in a state psychopathic hospital. See id. at 379. After his release, Robinson
continued to have random outbreaks of violence toward his wife and other family
members. See id. at 380-81.
In 1953, Robinson shot and killed his 18-month-old son and then shot himself in the
head in a suicide attempt. See id. at 381. His gunfire missing its mark, he then tried to
drown himself in a nearby lagoon. See id. Still unable to finish himself off, Robinson
eventually approached the police to confess to his actions. See id. For the killing of his
son, Robinson spent four years in jail. See id.
A few months after being released, Robinson took up residence with Flossie May
Ward in a common-law marriage. See id. at 376, 381. On the evening of the killing,
Robinson entered the restaurant where Flossie May worked brandishing a gun in his
hand. See id. at 382. "'Don't start nothing tonight,'" Flossie May told him, after which
he leapt with cat-like quickness over the counter, fired shots, and killed her outside the
building. See id. Robinson did not attempt to avoid arrest, although he did initially deny
knowledge of the killing. See id. at 382-83.
The prosecution made no attempt to rebut any of this testimony at trial, introducing
only a stipulation from a state clinical doctor stating that, in his medical opinion,
Robinson was aware of the nature of the proceedings against him and was able to
communicate with his counsel at the time the doctor examined him. See id. at 383.
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed Robinson's conviction. See Robinson, 174
N.E.2d at 824. The state supreme court held that: (1) there was insufficient evidence
proffered at Robinson's trial to require the trial court to conduct an incompetency
hearing; and (2) the evidence did not raise a reasonable doubt as to Robinson's sanity at
the time of the killing. See id. at 823. The United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari. See Robinson v. Pate, 368 U.S. 995 (1962).
69 See Pate, 383 U.S. 375, 377 (1966). After the initial denial of certiorari, Robinson
filed a habeas corpus petition, which the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois denied without a hearing. See id. Robinson then appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which reversed and remanded to
the district court with directions to, inter alia, determine whether the state court denied
Robinson due process by failing to hold an incompetency hearing. See Robinson v. Pate,
345 F.2d 691, 697-98 (7th Cir. 1965), rev'd, 383 U.S. 375 (1966). Finally, on
Robinson's second attempt, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. See Pate
v. Robinson, 382 U.S. 890 (1965).
"Habeas corpus writs" are defined as those whose -primary function . . [are] to
release [a prisoner] from unlawful imprisonment." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 709 (6th
ed. 1990). A habeas corpus proceeding does not determine the guilt or innocence of a
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The Court in Pate held that a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial
constitutionally entitles the defendant to an incompetency hearing
whenever evidence is put forth that raises a "'bona fide"' doubt as to his
competence to stand trial .7
The majority opinion, authored by Justice Clark, first noted the
generally accepted proposition that a state cannot convict a defendant if
he is legally incompetent. 71 Justice Clark then highlighted the evidence
proffered at Robinson's trial that raised a doubt as to the defendant's
competence. 72 This evidence, the majority opined, was sufficient to
mandate that the defendant receive a hearing on his competency to stand
trial. 73
The Court also noted that Robinson had a right to an
incompetency hearing under Illinois law, which "jealously guards" the
defendant's right to a fair trial.7 4
Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Black, dissented from the majority
decision and argued that the evidence presented at Robinson's trial did
not reach the level necessary to require the trial judge to hold a
competency hearing. 75 Yet even in dissent, Justice Harlan agreed with
the majority's general rule that a "defendant's present incompetence may
become sufficiently manifest during a trial that it denies 76him due
process" if the trial court fails to initiate a hearing on that issue.
The next Supreme Court attempt to clarify the due process interest
At issue in
in incompetency hearings came in Drope v. Missouri.
Drope was whether a defendant was denied due process when a trial
court, in the face of evidence of the defendant's incompetency, refused to
order a psychiatric examination to determine whether the defendant was
78
on trialbehavior
for attempted
forcible
competent
to stand trial.
before
the
rape, produced
evidenceTheofdefendant,
incompetent

prisoner, and the only issue it presents is "whether [the] prisoner is restrained of his
liberty by due process." Id.
See Pate, 383 U.S. at 385.
71 See id.at 378 (citing Bishop v. United States, 350 U.S. 961, 961
(1956) (per
curiam)).
72 See id. at 376-84; supra note 68 (detailing the evidence presented at
Robinson's
See Pate, 383 U.S. at 385.

74 See id. Under Illinois law at that time, a defendant was entitled to an incompetency
hearing whenever there is evidence proffered that tends to raise a "bona fide doubt" as to
1962).
his ability to stand trial. See People v. Shrake, 182 N.E.2d 754, 755 (I11.
75 See Pate, 383 U.S. at 388 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
76 Id. Justice Harlan's general disagreement with the majority centered on the level
of evidence produced, instead of the constitutional protection itself. See id. at 388-91
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
420 U.S. 162 (1975).
78 See id. at 163-64.
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commencement of his trial 79 and attempted suicide during the trial
itself.8s The trial judge, however, denied the motions for competency

evaluations, and a jury found Drope guilty.81 Drope, on appeal to the
Supreme Court, challenged his conviction, alleging that the trial court
violated his constitutional rights by failing to order an examination before
trial, and by conducting
the trial in his absence, which was the result of
82
his suicide attempt.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Burger, reversed
Drope's conviction, stating that the trial court failed to give proper
weight to evidence produced both before and during trial that suggested
Drope's incompetence. 83 The Court reiterated the holdings of Dusky and
Pate, and determined that the evidence presented in the record mandated
that the trial court inquire into whether the petitioner was competent to
stand trial . 84 First, the Court noted that there was sufficient evidence to
warrant a pretrial competency determination . 85 Furthermore, the Chief
Justice declared that sufficient evidence was produced after the6
commencement of the trial to warrant a competency hearing.8
79 See id. at 165-66.

Defendant Drope was indicted in Missouri for the attempted
forcible rape of his wife. See id.at 164. His attorney filed pretrial motions requesting
that the defendant receive a psychiatric evaluation, because, in his opinion, Drope was
"not a person of sound mind" and should be examined "before the case should be forced
to trial." Id. at 165.
In a report attached to the counsel's motion, the petitioner was described as, inter
alia, "markedly agitated and upset," "a very neurotic individual who is also depressed,"
and was diagnosed as suffering from "[slociopathic personality disorder, sexual
perversion, [and] [blorderline mental deficiency." Id.at 164-65 n.1. The trial court
denied these motions and proceeded to trial. See id.at 165.
Drope's wife also testified as to his sexual perversions, his habit of "roll[ing] down
the stairs" if he did not get his way, and his attempt to choke her a week before the trial
was to begin. See id. at 166.
80 See id. Because Drope shot himself in the abdomen, his
attorney moved for a
mistrial. See id. at 166-67. Yet the trial judge denied the motion, stating that any
difficulty faced in the proceeding without the defendant present "was brought about by
[the defendant], who was on bond and had a responsibility to be present." Id. at 166. A
jury found Drope guilty and, after he spent three weeks in a hospital recovering from the
suicide attempt, the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment. See id.at 167.
81 See id. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed Drope's conviction
after
determining that the trial court's denial of a psychiatric evaluation was not improper. See
id.at 168.
82 See Drope, 420 U.S. at 168-69.
83 See id.at 180-81.
84 See id.at 181.
For a discussion of Dusky, see supra notes 60-66 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of Pate, see supra notes 67-76 and accompanying
text.
See Drope, 420 U.S. at 177. Chief Justice Burger highlighted the report attached
to the pretrial motion, which detailed Drope's history of irrational behavior and his
diagnosis of borderline mental deficiency. See id.at 175-76.
See id.at 179. The Court opinion specifically stressed the testimony of Drope's
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Consequently, the Court overturned Drope's conviction on the grounds
87
that it violated due process.
In 1992, the Supreme Court addressed two important due process

challenges in Medina v. California:8s first, can a state allocate the burden

of proving incompetency to stand trial to the defendant; 8 9 and second, can
a state impose a rebuttable presumption of competency on the defendant
going to trial. 90 In answering both of these questions in the affirmative,
the Supreme Court, in a majority opinion written by Justice Kennedy,
proclaimed that neither of these procedures offended "'some principle of
justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience . . . as to be ranked as

fundamental."' 91
Initially, the Court articulated that the proper due process analysis
was the one announced in Patterson v. New York, 92 which required that a
less searching inquiry be made when examining a state law that regulated
the procedures by which the state carried out its criminal laws. 93
Applying this analysis, the majority asserted that both Court precedent
and historical and contemporary practice mandated a finding that the state

wife concerning Drope's attempt to choke her to death on the eve of the trial, as well as
his suicide attempt during the trial itself. See id. at 179-80. The Court maintained that
the proper course of action, once this evidence was proffered to the trial court, would
have been to suspend the proceedings until the court made a competency determination.
See id.at 181.
87 See id. at 183.
88 505 U.S. 437 (1992).
89 See id. at 446.
90 See id. at 452. The state statute at issue stated that "[i t shall be presumed that the
defendant is mentally competent unless it is proved by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant is mentally incompetent." CAL. PENAL CODE § 1369(f) (West 1982).
91 Medina, 505 U.S. at 446 (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202
(1977)).

432 U.S. 197 (1977). The Patterson Court upheld a state statute that placed on the
defendant the burden of proving the affirmative defense of extreme emotional
disturbance. See id. at 210. In upholding the statute, the Court noted that "it is normally
'within the power of the State to regulate procedures under which its laws are carried out,
including the burden of producing evidence and the burden of persuasion.'" Id. at 201.
93 See Medina, 505 U.S. at 445 (citing Patterson, 432 U.S. at 201-02). In applying
Patterson as the proper due process standard, the Court specifically distinguished
Mathews v. Eldridge. See Medina, 505 U.S. at 443 (citing 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
The Medina Court determined that the balancing test of Mathews was inappropriate in a
criminal realm, as that test "was first conceived to address due process claims arising in
the context of administrative law." Id. at 444. Furthermore, the Court noted that the
Mathews framework had been applied to resolve due process challenges in criminal law
on only two occasions, both of which were distinguishable from the facts before it. See
id. at 444; see also Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 407-08 (1993) (applying Medina to
determine if a state-imposed time-limit on motions for new trial "offends some principle
of justice so rooted in tradition and conscience of our people as to rank as fundamental"
(quoting Patterson, 432 U.S. at 202)).
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rules were not so offensive to a fundamental principle of justice as to be
deemed unconstitutional .9

Furthermore, Justice Kennedy noted that the defendant's due process
rights were sufficiently guarded, even with the burden of proof placed
upon the defendant. 95 Moreover, the Justice contended that placing the

burden on the defendant would prove outcome-determinative in only a
small number of cases. 96 In addition, the majority declared that due
process merely guarantees a criminal defendant "a reasonable opportunity
to demonstrate that he is not competent to stand trial" 97 and "does
on the basis
not . . . require a State to adopt one procedure over another
98
that it may produce results more favorable to the accused."
Justice Blackmun, in dissent, insisted that "a Constitution that
forbids the trial and conviction of an incompetent person [cannot]
tolerate[ the trial and conviction of a person about whom the evidence of
competency is so equivocal and unclear." 9 9 The Justice disagreed with
the majority's application of Patterson, and believed that in reality the
Court actually applied a balancing test via Mathews v. Eldridge. 0 0
Justice Blackmun argued that the "Due Process Clause is not the Some

94 See Medina, 505 U.S.

at 446. The Court noted that there was "no settled
tradition" in either English or early American law as to the proper allocation of a burden
of proof. See id. at 446-47. Furthermore, the majority stated that modern American
jurisdictions were divided: some placed the burden on the "moving party;" some placed

it on the defendant; and some placed it on the state. See id. at 447-48.
The Court also highlighted Supreme Court precedent in finding that "it is enough
that the State affords the criminal defendant on whose behalf a plea of incompetence is
asserted a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate that he is not competent to stand trial."
Id. at 451. The Court then declared that "in essence, the challenged presumption [that a
state cannot place a rebuttable presumption upon the defendant] is a restatement of the
burden of proof, and it follows from what we have said that the presumption does not
violate the Due Process Clause." Id. at 453.
See id. at 449.
96 See id. Justice Kennedy noted that a preponderance of the evidence standard
would only affect those "narrow class of cases where the evidence is in equipoise; that is,
where the evidence that a defendant is competent is just as strong as the evidence that he
is incompetent." Id.
Id. at 451.
98 Id. Justice O'Connor authored an opinion, joined by Justice Souter, concurring in
the judgment, and disagreed that Patterson was the proper due process standard. See id.
at 453 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice O'Connor applied the
balancing test of Mathews, yet concluded that it was constitutionally permissible to place
the burden on the defendant. See id. at 455 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
99 Medina, 505 U.S. at 456 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
100 See id. at 462 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Initially, Justice Blackmun found fault
with the majority's distinction between Mathews and Patterson, because the sole question
at issue was whether the state procedure was "adequate" to protect the defendant's right
to not be tried while incompetent. See id. at 459 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Process Clause" and that the clause must require "some conceivable steps
be taken to eliminate the risk of erroneous convictions." 101

The case of a possibly-incompetent defendant was next addressed in
As Justice Thomas's opinion for ie Court
Godinez v. Moran.
articulated, the question at issue in Godinez was whether the competency
standard necessary for a defendant to plead guilty or waive his right 1to3
trial. 0
counsel was the same as the competency standard for standing
Initially, the Court addressed the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of due
process, which required a defendant to have the ability to make a
"reasoned choice" before being allowed to waive counsel or plead guilty,
a standard the lower court' determined was distinct from the Dusky test of
"rational understanding." 10 4 The Court disagreed and stated that the
Dusky standard, sufficiently adequate to protect defendants who plead not
guilty, must be sufficiently adequate to protect those who plead guilty.' 05
Furthermore, Justice Thomas remarked that there was "no reason to
believe that the decision to waive counsel requires an appreciably higher
level of mental functioning than the decision to waive other constitutional
rights." 106 Finally, the Justice asserted that due process allows states to
101 Id. at 463, 466 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun did not disagree with

the majority's belief that the allocation of a burden would only be determinative in a
limited number of cases. See id. at 467 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Yet the Justice did
opine that "[i]n those few difficult cases, the State should bear the burden.., of
ensur[ing] that [the defendant] is competent to defend himself." Id. The Justice also
asserted that when due process is implicated, "'It]he individual should not be asked to
share equally with society the risk of error when the possible injury to the individual is
significantly greater than any possible harm to the state.'" Id. (quoting Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979)).
102 509 U.S. 389 (1993). Godinez, like its incompetent ancestor Pate before it,
traveled twice to the Supreme Court. See id. at 391-96. Defendant Moran was tried and
convicted of murder in the Nevada state court system. See id.at 391-93. The Supreme
Court of Nevada upheld his conviction, and the United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari. See Moran v. Whitley, 493 U.S. 874 (1989).
Moran then filed a petition for habeas corpus, which was denied by the United States
District Court for the District of Nevada. See Godinez, 509 U.S. at 393. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, stating that "'[clompetency to
waive constitutional rights,'" such as waiving of counsel or pleading guilty, "'requires a
higher level of mental functioning than that required to stand trial.'" Id. at 394 (quoting
Moran v. Godinez, 972 F.2d 263, 266 (9th Cir. 1992)). Because the issue had divided
state courts and federal courts of appeals, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. See
Godinez v. Moran, 506 U.S. 1033 (1992).
103See Godinez, 509 U.S. at 391.
104 See id. at 397.

105 See id.at 398-99. Justice Thomas's majority opinion confessed that "[hiow [the
reasonable choice] standard is different from (much less higher than) the Dusky
standard-whether the defendant has a 'rational understanding' of the proceedings-is
not readily apparent to us." Id. at 397.
106 Id. at 399.
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enact "more elaborate" competency standards
than required by Dusky,
07
but does not mandate such enactments.1
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Scalia, authored an opinion
concurring in part and in the judgment.108 The Justice wrote separately
to enunciate that the Due Process Clause does not accept the application
of differing standards of competency to different situations that may arise
in the course of a trial.' 0 9- Because the single Dusky standard of
competency did not "offend any 'principle of justice so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental,"'
Justice Kennedy proffered that applying differing standards of
competency at different trial stages would "disrupt the orderly course of
trial and . . . prove unworkable both at trial and on appellate review." 110
Justice Blackmun, in a dissent joined by Justice Stevens, proclaimed
the Court's opinion a "death sentence for a person whose decision to
discharge counsel, plead guilty, and present no defense well may have
been the product of medication or mental illness.""'
The dissent
suggested that the standard for competence was "specifically designed"
to ensure that a defendant had the ability to consult with counsel and
assist in his own defense. 1 2 The Justice argued that the reliability of
such a finding, and therefore its due process protection, "vanishes when
its basic premise-that counsel will be present-ceases to exist." 113 In
contrast to the majority, Justice Blackmun recognized that competency in
one trial context is not necessarily the same as competency in another
context. 1 4 Finally, the dissent asserted that the "reasonable choice"
standard applied by the Ninth Circuit provided better protection to a

107

See id. at 402. To the majority, the Due Process Clause, in prohibiting the trial of

an incompetent defendant, "has a modest aim:

[it

seeks to ensure that he has capacity to

understand the proceedings and to assist counsel." Id.
108See Godinez, 509 U.S. at 402 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and in the
judgment).
I See id. at 404 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). Justice
Kennedy maintained that differing standards were "never the rule at common law, and it
would take some extraordinary showing of the inadequacy of a single standard of

competency for [the Court] to require States to employ heightened standards." Id.
11 Id. at 408 (Kennedy, J.,concurring in part and in the judgment).
In Id. at 409 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
112 See id. at 412 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun noted that a finding of
incompetency establishes "only that [the defendant] is capable of aiding his attorney in
making the critical decisions required at a trial or in plea negotiations."
Id. at 413

(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
13 Godinez, 509 U.S. at 413 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
114 See id. To Justice Blackmun, the majority's "monolithic approach to competency
is true to neither life nor the law." Id.
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defendant than a "reasonable understanding" test, because the former

implies an ability to act, rather than just an ability to comprehend. 15
In an effort to further clarify the standards applicable to
incompetency proceedings, the United States Supreme Court, in Cooper
v. Oklahoma,116 confronted the issue of whether a state statute that placed

a burden of clear and convincing evidence upon a criminal defendant

seeking to show his incompetence to stand trial violated due process." 7

The Supreme Court unanimously reversed Cooper's conviction by the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals in an opinion authored by Justice

Stevens. 118
The Court first acknowledged a criminal defendant's fundamental
liberty interest not to be tried while incompetent, 119 and Justice Stevens
quoted from the concurrence in Riggins v. Nevada12 to emphasize the
significance of that interest. 121 The Justice also reiterated that the test for
incompetence, first set out in Dusky, was whether the defendant had
"sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable
degree of rational understanding . . . [and] a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him." 122
115

See id. at 415 & n.3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun contended that

the majority failed to recognize "that, in the distinction between a defendant who
possesses a 'rational understanding' of the proceedings and one who is able to make a
'rational choice,' lies the difference between the capacity for passive and active
involvement in the proceedings." Id.
116 S. Ct. 1373 (1996).
117 See id. at 1374-75.
116

118

See id. at 1374, 1384.

119 See id. at 1376 (citing Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 453 (1992); Drope v.

Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-72 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966));
see also supra notes 67-76 and accompanying text (discussing Pate); supra notes 77-87
and accompanying text (discussing Drope); supra notes 88-101 and accompanying text
(discussing Medina).
120 504 U.S. 127, 139 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice
Kennedy noted that:
[ciompetence to stand trial is rudimentary, for upon it depends the main
part of those rights deemed essential to a fair trial, including the right to
effective assistance of counsel, the right to summon, to confront, and to
cross-examine witnesses, and the right to testify on one's own behalf or to
remain silent without penalty for doing so.
Id. at 139-40 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted).
121 See Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at 1376-77.
The Court noted that "the right not to stand
trial while incompetent is sufficiently important to merit protection even if the defendant
has failed to make a timely request for a competency determination." Id. at 1377 n.4
(citing Pate, 383 U.S. at 384).
122 Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The Oklahoma statutory standard of competency is substantially similar
to that adopted by the Dusky Court, asking whether the defendant has the "present ability
of a person arrested for or charged with a crime to understand the nature of the charges
and proceedings against him and to effectively and rationally assist in his defense."
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2
The Court then explained the holding of Medina v. California,

3

which noted that states may presume the competency of a criminal
defendant and force that defendant to prove incompetency by a
preponderance of the evidence.' 2 4

The Medina Court, Justice Stevens

stated, focused its due process inquiry on whether a presumption of
competency "offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." 125 Justice

Stevens explained that Medina determined that a presumption of
competency did not offend any recognized principle of "fundamental

fairness"'2 6 because the procedural rule at issue affected only a small
segment of the competency cases. 127 More specifically, the Court
elaborated, the rule at issue in Medina would only be invoked when the
evidence tending to show competency was equally as strong as the
evidence against it. 128

The Court distinguished the issue in Cooper from the issue in
Medina.129 Justice Stevens explained that Cooper posed the question of
"whether a State may proceed with a criminal trial after the defendant
has demonstrated that he is more likely than not incompetent."' 30 The
Court noted that Oklahoma did not argue that it could impose the higher
standard of beyond a reasonable doubt on the defendant,
yet the state
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1175.1(1) (West Supp. 1996).
123 505 U.S. 437 (1992).
124 See Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at 1377 (citing Medina v. California, 505 U.S.
437, 449

(1992)); see also supra notes 88-101 and accompanying text (discussing Medina).
125 Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at 1377 (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202
(1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
126 See supra note 9 and accompanying text (addressing the notion of "fundamental
fairness").
127 See Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at 1377 (citing Medina, 505 U.S. at 449).
128 See id.
129 See id.
130 Id. Oklahoma argued that, under Court precedent, "although due process requires
basic procedural safeguards be observed, balancing of society's interest against those of
the accused has been left to the legislative branch." Respondent's Brief, supra note 38,
at *12-13. Under this balancing approach, "the clear and convincing intermediate level
of proof adopted by [the] Legislature is sufficient to protect the values of society and is an
accurate reflection of how the risk of error should be distributed." Id. at * 13.
131 See Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at 1377 (citing Transcript of Oral Argument at *46-47,
Cooper v. Oklahoma, 116 S. Ct. 1373 (No. 95-5207) (1996) (available in 1996 WL
21695)) (the counsel for the State "very much doubt[ed] if any State could enact [a
standard of] beyond a reasonable doubt consistent with the fundamental requirement of
fairness and an opportunity for the defendant")). Only one state, Maryland, requires a
burden of beyond a reasonable doubt in competency proceedings, and there the burden is
on the state to disprove the defendant's incompetency. See Langworthy v. State, 416
A.2d 1287, 1295 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1980) (stating that a trial judge, "even if he is
persuaded by a preponderance of evidence ... or, yet more, he is persuaded clearly and
convincingly ... he must still find the defendant incompetent absent persuasion beyond
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did contend that a standard of clear and convincing evidence sufficiently
12
3
balanced both the state's and defendant's competing interests.
Regardless, the Court was "persuaded, by both traditional and modern
practice and the importance of the constitutional interest at stake" that the

State's argument was erroneous.133
In its next step toward rejecting Oklahoma's argument, the Court
discussed the history of competency evaluations to determine whether
earlier courts had deemed competency interests fundamental. 134 Justice

Stevens began the inquiry by examining the traditions of the English
common law.135 The Justice, while noting that pre-constitutional English
1 36
case history did not clearly delineate a standard of competency,
observed that prominent English jurisprudential theorists felt a court
could not try a "mad" defendant. 3 7 By the Eighteenth Century, the
Court stated, English cases began to hint at the proper standard through

jury instructions.1 3

Justice Stevens highlighted the case Queen v.

a reasonable doubt in the other direction"), cert. denied sub nom. Langworthy v.
Mgaland, 450 U.S. 960 (1981).
See Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at 1377. Oklahoma claimed that a higher standard was
justified in light of the substantial procedural safeguards afforded to criminal defendants.
See Respondent's Brief, supra note 38, at *22. The State looked to, inter alia, the
defendant's ability to have counsel provided, to be examined by psychiatric experts at
state expense, and that the issue of competency could be raised at any time during the
criminal procedure. See id. at *22, *28; see also supra note 43 (detailing the procedural
protections afforded under Oklahoma law). The State thought that these protections,
which were not available to the same degree at the early common law, sufficiently
justified a heightened standard that would better protect the State's interest. See
ReBondent's Brief, supra note 38, at *22.
13

Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at 1377.

See id. at 1377-80.
135See id. at 1377.
136 See id. The earliest case the Court cited was Trial of Charles Bateman, which was
decided in 1685. See id. (citing 11 How. St. Tr. 474 (1816)). The Bateman court noted
that "nothing is more certain law, than that a person who falls mad after a crime
supposed to be committed, shall not be tried for it." Id. at 476; see also Kinloch's Case,
18 How. St. Tr. 395, 411 (1746) ("[N]o trial ought to proceed to the condemnation of a
man, who by the providence of God is rendered totally incapable of speaking for himself,
or of instructing others to speak for him.").
137See Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at 1377-78; see also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 864 (George Chase ed., 4th ed. 1938). In the well-known commentaries
authored by Blackstone, the renowned English legal scholar, it is stated that:
In criminal cases therefore, idiots and lunatics are not chargeable for their
own acts, if committed when under these incapacities ....

Also, if a man

in his sound memory commits a capital offense, and before arraignment for
it, he becomes mad, he ought not to be arraigned for it; because he is not
able to plead to it with that advice and caution that he ought. And if, after
he has pleaded, the prisoner becomes mad, he shall not be tried: for how
can he make his defense?
Id.

138

See Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at 1378.
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Goode,139 where the English court instructed the jury to determine
whether the defendant was "insane or not."' 40
The Court also

recognized that in 1800, England codified the common-law rule that a
jury could be assembled to determine the competency
of a defendant
4

charged with treason, murder, or some other felony.' '
These

English

authorities,

the Court stated,

stood

for

the

proposition that, traditionally, a jury determining the competence of a
defendant considered whether he was "more likely than not"
incompetent. 42 There was nothing in these cases, the Justice observed,
that hinted to a standard higher than a preponderance of the evidence, and
more specifically to clear and convincing evidence. 143 Justice Stevens
also acknowledged that these cases did not indicate that these
preponderance-like standards were a departure from even earlier

practice. 144
Having determined that old-English law had not employed a clear
and convincing standard, the Court reasoned that it must move forward in
time to examine modern case law. 145 The Justice found more supportive
evidence in twentieth-century English law, where the court in Queen v.

139 112 Eng. Rep. 572 (K.B. 1837).
The defendant in Goode was charged with
"uttering seditious words" against the Queen when he claimed that she was "an usurper"
and that he would "have [her] off the throne." Id..
140 See Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at 1378. Justice Stevens noted these
early courts often

referred to a defendant's "insanity" rather than his "competence."
See id. n.8.
Regardless of the terminology used, however, the Court recognized that the key issue in
these cases was whether the defendant was sufficiently able to comprehend the nature of
the trial and the charges against him. See id. (quoting King v. Pritchard, 173 Eng. Rep.
135, 135 (K.B. 1836) (jury properly impaneled to determine whether mute defendant
charged with bestiality had "sufficient intellect to comprehend the course of the
proceedings, so as to make a proper defence")).
141 See id. at 1378; see also Criminal Lunatics Act, 1800, 39 & 40 Geo. 3, ch. 94, § 2
(Eng.). The act mandated that if "any person indicted for any offence" was found to be
insane "by a jury lawfully impannelled for that purpose, so that such person cannot be
tried," the court was to "order such person to be kept in strict custody until his Majesty's
pleasure shall be known." Id.
142 See Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at 1378.
Justice Stevens placed emphasis on the
"disjunctive" phrasing of these jury instructions. See id. While many of the courts
issuing these jury instructions did not use the exact phrase "preponderance of the
evidence," the disjunctive language necessitates finding a defendant to be either
competent or incompetent based upon the same inquiry. See id.; see also BLACK's LAW
DICTIONARY 1183 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "preponderance of the evidence" as "evidence
which is of greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in
opposition to it" and "evidence which as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved
is more probable than not").
143 See Cooper, 116 S.
Ct. at 1378.
144 See id.
145 See id.at 1378-80.
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Podola14 6 ruled "'the onus [of proving incompetency] is discharged if the

on the balance of probabilities"' that the defendant is
jury [is] satisfied
47
incompetent. 1

The Court next examined the historical practice in the United States
and noted that the earliest American case law echoed the previously

examined English authorities. 148

The Justice noted that there was an

explicit use of a preponderance standard by the turn of the twentieth
century.1 49 The Court first looked to Jordan v. State,1 50 where a jury

instruction from a Tennessee court indicated that a competenc y
proceeding must be "'controlled by a preponderance of the proof.' 151
This standard, the Court noted, echoed the one used by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Simanowicz. 152 Again, Justice
Stevens reiterated that these authorities did not use a standard of clear
and convincing evidence.' 53 The Justice also remarked that many of
these early cases distinctly mentioned the common-law roots of
146 3 All E.R. 418
(1959).

Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at 1379 (quoting Queen v. Podola, 3 All E.R. 418, 429
(1959)). Chief Justice Lord Parker, writing in Podola, noted that such a test has been
applied "so often that [it] may be said to be firmly embodied in our law." Podola, 3 All
E.R. at 431.
148 See Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at 1379. The Court noted that in Comnonwealth v. Braley,
a case decided following the ratification of the Constitution in Massachusetts, the court
instructed the jury to consider "'whether [the accused] neglected or refused to plead to
the indictment against him for murder, of his free will and malice, or whether he did so
neglect by the act of God.'" Id. n.12 (citing 1 Mass. 102 (1804)) (alteration in original).
The Court hypothesized that this instruction may have been a precursor to the "sane or
insane" disjunctive employed by other English and American courts of this period. See
id. See generally Freeman v. People, 4 Deio 9 (N.Y. 1847) (adopting jury instructions
of King v. Dyson, 173 Eng. Rep. 135 (1836)). These cases, while not explicitly adopting
a preponderance standard, often stated the inquiry in the disjunctive, similar to the early
English courts. See supra note 142 and accompanying text (discussing use of disjunctive
phrasing in early English jury instructions).
149See Cooper, 116S. Ct. at 1379.
150135 S.W. 327 (Tenn. 1911). The Jordan court noted that the object of an
147

incompetency hearing is "to determine whether [the defendant] has mind and discretion
which would enable him to appreciate the charge against him, the proceedings thereon,
and enable him to make a proper defense." Id. at 329.
151 Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at 1379 (quoting Jordan, 135 S.W. at 329).
152See id.; 89 A. 562, 563 (Pa. 1913). In Simanowicz, competency was determined
"by a preponderance of the evidence." 89 A. at 563. As the Cooper Court noted, a
sampling of case law from many jurisdictions reinforced its findings that a preponderance
standard was the traditional standard for competency determinations. See Cooper, 116 S.
Ct. at 1379 n.14; see, e.g., State v. Arnold, 12 Iowa 479, 484 (1861) ("A doubt must be
raised whether at the time there is such mental impairment ...as to render it probable
that the prisoner cannot... have a full, fair and impartial trial."); People v. McElvaine,
26 N.E. 929, 933 (N.Y. 1891) (noting the court "had sufficient grounds before it to judge
as to the probability of [defendant's] present sanity").
153See Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at 1379-80.

1997]
competency standards.

NOTE
54

761

Finally, the Court commented that Oklahoma

had no quarrel with the notion that early cases used a preponderance
standard.
Having determined that, historically, the preponderance standard

was employed in competency determinations, the Court discussed the
current standards in American jurisdictions.1 56

First, Justice Stevens

explained that only four jurisdictions required a burden of clear and
convincing evidence in competency determinations, 1 57 and the remaining
jurisdictions apply no more than a preponderance standard. 15 1 While
154 See id. at 1379 n.14; see, e.g., French v. State, 67 N.W.
706, 710 (Wis. 1896)

(noting a competency statute "providing for an inquisition, where there is a probability
that the accused is . .. insane, and thereby incapacitated to act for himself, to determine
whether he is so insane, is substantially [an] affirmance of a power the court had at
common law in such cases, as abundantly appears from the authorities").
155 See Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at 1380 n.15. Oklahoma argued that even if
"common law
demanded and applied a preponderance of the evidence burden... [history] does not
compel such a result today." Respondent's Brief, supra note 38, at *21. To assume
such a deferential approach to history, the State argued, "'would be to stamp upon [the
Court's] jurisprudence the unchangeableness attributed to the laws of the Medes and the
Persians.'" Id. (quoting Burnham v. Superior Ct., 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990)).
See Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at 1380.
157 See id. & n.16; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-56d(b) (1994) (stating
the standard for
incompetency proceedings to be clear and convincing evidence); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
22, § 1175.4(B) (West Supp. 1996) (same); 50 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7403(a) (Supp. 1996)
(same); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-5.3-3(5)(b) (Supp. 1995) (same). Since the Cooper
decision, Connecticut, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island have amended their
incompetency tests to meet the Cooper preponderance standard. See 1996 Conn. Legis.
Serv. 96-215 (West) (changing the standard from clear and convincing evidence to
preponderance of the evidence); 1996 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 161 (West) (same); 1996
Pa. Legis. Serv. 77 (West) (same); 1996 R.I. Pub. Laws 96-299 (same).
158 See Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at 1380 & n.17; see, e.g., 1996 Alaska
Sess. Laws. 62
(West); CAL. PENALCODE § 1369(0 (West 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-8-111(2)
(West 1990); Diaz v. State, 508 A.2d 861, 863 (Del. 1986); Flowers v. State, 353 So. 2d
1259, 1260 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Johnson v. State, 433 S.E.2d 717, 719 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1993); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/104-11(c) (West 1992); State v. Rhode, 503
N.W.2d 27, 35 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993); State v. Rogers, 419 So. 2d 840, 843 (La. 1982);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 15(d) (West Supp. 1996); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 20.01,
subd. 3(6); State v. Ehrenberg, 284 N.J. Super. 309, 313, 664 A.2d 1301, 1303 (Law
Div. 1994); People v. Lopez, 484 N.Y.S.2d 974, 981 (App. Div. 1985); State v.
VanNatta, 506 N.W.2d 63, 65 (N.D. 1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.37(A)
(Anderson 1996); State v. Nance, 466 S.E.2d 349, 351 (S.C. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 23A-1OA-6.1 (Michie 1988); TEX. CRIM. P. CODE ANN. § 46.02(1)(b) (West
1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-15-5(10) (1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-169.1(E) (Michie
1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.77.090(2) (West 1990); W. VA. CODE § 27-6a-2(b)
(1992); Loomer v. State, 768 P.2d 1042, 1045 (Wyo. 1989).
Only one state requires a burden of beyond a reasonable doubt, yet the burden falls
on the state to disprove the defendant's incompetency. See Langworthy v. State, 416
A.2d 1287, 1295 (MVd. Ct. Spec. App. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. Langworthy v.
Maryland, 450 U.S. 960 (1981) (stating that a trial judge, "even if he is persuaded by a
preponderance of the evidence.., or yet more, he is persuaded clearly and convincingly
...
he must still find the defendant incompetent absent persuasion beyond a reasonable
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1 59
some of these states require the defendant to prove his incompetency,
Justice Stevens recognized that a number of jurisdictions place the burden

to prove the defendant's competency on the prosecution once the issue
has been raised.1 60 Furthermore, the Justice observed that the standard

for competency determinations in federal courts places a burden on the

doubt in the other direction").
Some of the jurisdictions do not make clear what the appropriate standard is. See,
e.g., ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 11.5(b)(3) ("If the court determines that the defendant is
incompetent ... it shall order him committed ... ."). Yet nothing in the case law
traditions of these states suggests that the standard is higher than a preponderance of the
evidence. See, e.g., Mitchell v. State, 913 S.W.2d 264, 266 (Ark. 1996) (proclaiming
that a defendant is presumed competent unless he proves otherwise); State v. Clark, 546
S.W.2d 455, 468 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (proclaiming that, in incompetency proceedings,
the "[tlraditional burden of proof has no meaning").
159 See Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at 1380; see, e.g., Mask v. State, 869 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Ark.
1993) (placing burden of proof on defendant); Rhode, 503 N.W.2d at 35 (same); Mozee
v. Commonwealth, 769 S.W.2d 757, 758 (Ky. 1989) (same); Rogers, 419 So. 2d at 843
(same); Johnson, 433 S.E.2d at 719 (same); State v. Caudill, 789 S.W.2d 213, 215 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1990) (same); State v. Chapman, 721 P.2d 392, 395-96 (N.M. 1986) (same);
State v. Baker, 320 S.E.2d 670, 677 (N.C. 1984) (same); Nance, 466 S.E.2d at 351
(same); Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715, 729 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (same).
See Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at 1380 & n.18; Lackey v. State, 615 So. 2d 145, 152
(Ala. Crim. App. 1992) (placing burden of proof on prosecution); Diaz v. State, 508
A.2d 861, 863 (Del. 1986) (same); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/104-11(c) (West 1992)
(same); Langworthy, 416 A.2d at 1294 (same); Commonwealth v. Prater, 651 N.E.2d
833, 837 (Mass. 1995) (same); Griffin v. State, 504 So. 2d 186, 191 (Miss. 1987) (same);
People v. Lopez, 484 N.Y.S.2d 974, 981 (App. Div. 1985) (same); VanNatta, 506
N.W.2d at 65 (same); State v. Pruitt, 480 N.E.2d 499, 506 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (same);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-1OA-6.1 (Michie 1988) (same).
Some states place the burden of proving or disproving the defendant's incompetency
on the party, either the prosecution or defense, that initially raises the issue. See, e.g.,
COL. REv. STAT. ANN. § 16-8-111(2) (West 1990) (placing burden of proof in
competency proceeding on the "party asserting" incompetency); UTAH CODE ANN. § 7715-5(10) (1995) (placing burden on "proponent of incompetency"); VA. CODE ANN. §
19.2-169.1(E) (Michie 1995) (placing burden on "party alleging that defendant is
incompetent"); Loomer, 768 P.2d at 1045 (placing burden on "party seeking to establish
that the accused is competent").
Still other states take the approach of assigning no specific burden to either party in
an incompetency proceeding. See, e.g., Flowers, 353 So. 2d at 1260 (determining that,
once the defendant's competency is made an issue, by either the defense or the
prosecution, "the matter is simply submitted to the conscience of the trial judge");
Montano v. State, 649 N.E.2d 1053, 1057 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that a failure to
assign the burden to either party under state statute did not violate due process).
California takes a unique approach in its burden placement, placing the burden on
the prosecution only when it is the "only party seeking" an incompetency finding. See
People v. Skeirik, 280 Cal. Rptr. 175, 184 (Ct. App. 1991). When neither the
prosecution nor the defense counsel questions the defendant's competency, and instead
the trial court raises the issue, the court then "assumes the burden of producing evidence
of incompetence," and the court "should not instruct the jury that either party has the
burden of proof." Id.
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16
defendant to prove incompetency by a preponderance of the evidence. 1
As a result of "[t]he near-uniform application of a standard that is more

protective of the defendant's rights than Oklahoma's clear and convincing
evidence rule,"' 162 the Court determined that the State's "heightened
standard offends a principle of justice that
is deeply 'rooted in the
63
traditions and conscience of our people."" 1
Justice Stevens next inquired whether the Oklahoma standard
exhibited "fundamental fairness in operation." 164 In answering this

question in the negative, the Court initially reinforced the function of a

"burden of proof." 165 The Court explained that a burden standard
functions to "instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence
our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions
for a particular type of adjudication." 166 Furthermore, Justice Stevens
stressed that the higher a standard of proof placed on aparty, "'the more
that party bears the risk of an erroneous decision."" 6 Because of this
risk, Justice Stevens elaborated, due process places a heightened burden
on the state in certain proceedings where "individual interests at
stake . . . are both 'particularly
important' and 'more substantial than
68
mere loss of money."" 1
161 See Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at 1380; 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)
(1988) (stating the proper

standard in incompetency proceedings to be preponderance of the evidence).
162 Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at 1380.
163 Id. (quoting Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445 (1992)).
164 Id. (quoting Medina, 505 U.S. at 448 (citing Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S.
342, 352 (1990))) (internal quotation marks omitted).
See id. at 1380-81.
Id.at 1381 (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (quoting
In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring))) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The Addington Court held that to justify civil commitment, the state must
satisfy its commitment criteria by clear and convincing evidence. See 441 U.S. at 433.
Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at 1381 (quoting Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497
U.S. 261, 283 (1990)).
168Id. (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982)
(quoting Addington,
441 U.S. at 424)). The Court also noted other situations where a heightened burden of
proof has been allowed. See id. n.19 (citing Addington, 441 U.S. at 433 (involuntary
civil commitment); Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 277 (1966) (deportation); Chaunt v.
United States, 364 U.S. 350, 355 (1960) (denaturalization); Schneiderman v. United
States, 320 U.S. 118, 158 (1943) (same)).
Oklahoma argued that the Court's holdings in Cruzan and Ohio v. Akron Centerfor
Reproductive Health allowed the state to impose heightened burdens when that standard
"served as a 'societal judgment about how the risk of error should be distributed between
the litigants.'" Respondent's Brief, supra note 38, at *26 (quoting Cruzan, 497 U.S. at
280; citing Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990)). Yet Justice
Stevens distinguished and limited the scope of these decisions. See Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at
1381 n.19. Cruzan, the Justice argued, allowed a heightened standard of clear and
convincing evidence where a third party was making a decision to terminate the lifesupport of an incompetent patient, because the consequences of that third-party's
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The Court concluded that the Oklahoma standard placed a
substantial risk on the defendant because it may lead to an erroneous
determination.1 69 Medina was distinguishable, the Justice explained,
because in that case an incorrect competency determination imposed no
similarly substantial risk on the defendant. 170 The placement of the
preponderance burden in Medina, Justice Stevens opined, would only be
important in the limited number of "cases in which the evidence on either
side [is] equally balanced."' 7' The Court noted that the danger of
erroneous decisions was far greater in the present scenario because
Oklahoma's clear and convincing evidence standard would affect cases
where the defendant had already shown that he or she was "more likely
than not" incompetent. 172
Furthermore, the Court noted, the results of an incorrect
competency decision for the defendant were "dire." 173 Because the
defendant was more likely than not incompetent and had not reached the
clear and convincing burden, the Court expressed fear that he may be
unable to effectively participate in his defense, or employ other
fundamental rights afforded to him that are essential to a fair trial. 7 4
The Court recognized that a defendant found to be competent would then
have to determine, inter alia, whether to plead guilty, to waive his
privilege against self-incrimination, or to bypass his right to "confront"
his accusers through cross-examination.
Justice Stevens concluded
therefore that competence, because of its pertinence to these other rights,
is a "fundamental component of our criminal justice system. 176

decision, if erroneous, were "irreversible."

See id. (citing Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280).

Furthermore, Justice Stevens reasoned that the Court upheld the heightened standard in
Akron Center, where an Ohio statute required an unemancipated woman who sought an

abortion to show by clear and convincing evidence that a judicial bypass of the State
parental notification requirement was appropriate, "largely because the proceeding at
issue was ex parte." Id. (citing Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. at 515-16).
169 See Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at 1381.

See id.
171 Id. In Medina, while the lower court employed a preponderance of the evidence
170

standard, the Court felt that this burden would only "affect competency determinations in
a narrow class of cases where the evidence is in equipoise; that is, where the evidence
that a defendant is competent is just as strong as the evidence that he is incompetent."
Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 449 (1992); see also supra note 96 and

accompanying text.
172See Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at 1381.
173 See
id.
174 See id. (quoting Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 139 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment)).
175See id.at 1381-82.
176 Id. at 1382 (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653 (1984)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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The Court next explained that it must examine whether the
defendant's substantial interest in an accurate competency determination

outweighed

the state's interest

in preventing a defendant from

177

Justice Stevens recognized that the state had an interest
malingering.
in limiting court expenses and providing prompt judicial resolutions, but

determined that these were "modest" in comparison to the defendant's
interests. 178 First, the Justice reiterated that a state is able to detain an

incompetent defendant for a reasonable time "'to determine whether there
is a substantial probability that he will attain [competence] in the
foreseeable future."" 79 Next, the Court professed that some defendants
would be successful in faking incompetency, yet presumed "that it is
unusual for even the most artful malingerer to feign incompetence
successfully for a period of time while under professional care.""'
Finally, the Court questioned why such a heightened standard, if
necessary to protect the state's interests, 11 had only been adopted by four
Justice Stevens presumed that the early courts were
jurisdictions.
similarly forced to combat defendants who faked competency; these
courts, however, had felt no need to apply a standard higher than a
preponderance of the evidence. 183
The Court accepted that even if it were appropriate to place the
burden on the "proponent of an issue," that alone did not justify raising
the standard that the proponent must prove. 184 Because a heightened
See Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at 1382.
See id.
179 Id. (quoting Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972)) (alteration in original).
177
178

If a defendant regains competence or is found to be fraudulent, the state can proceed with
the trial. See Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738. Beyond the traditional NGRI verdict, some

states have adopted another verdict in criminal cases, generally called "guilty but
mentally ill" (GBMI).

See, e.g., MicH. COMP.

LAWS ANN.

§ 768.36 (West 1982).

Generally, the effect of a GBMI verdict is that the defendant is sentenced as if she were
found guilty, but she may begin to serve that sentence by receiving psychiatric care in
either a prison or a mental institution. See DRESSLER, supra note 12, § 25.08, at 316-17.
If the defendant is "cured" during this initial treatment period, she will be returned to the
general prison population to complete her prison sentence. See id.
180Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at 1382.
181 See Respondent's Brief, supra note 38, at *28 (claiming that a clear and convincing
standard limits the "chances of [a defendant] manipulating the facts to result in an
erroneous finding of incompetency").
182 See supra note 158 (listing those jurisdictions that applied the clear and convincing
standard prior to the Cooper decision).
193See Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at 1382. The courts of the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, for instance, "warned jurors charged with making competency determinations
that 'there may be great fraud in this matter.'" Id. (quoting King v. Dyson, 173 Eng.
Rep 135, 136 n.(a) (1831)) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
See id. As the district court explained in United States v. Chisoln,
[it would be a reproach to justice if a guilty man .. . postponed his trial
upon a feigned condition of the mind, as to his inability to aid in his
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standard does not decrease the risk that an incorrect competency
determination will be made, the Court accepted that it "simply reallocates
the risk between the parties." 18 5 Justice Stevens confessed that the Court
could perceive no basis for allocating the "large share of the risk which
accompanies a clear and convincing evidence standard" 186 to the
defendant because the issue of competence will be raised in cases where
one side would easily prevail and in cases where the evidence would be
strong enough to prevail on a preponderance standard, but not on the
clear and convincing evidence standard. 187 Even though the Court
recognized the importance of Oklahoma's interests, the Justice concluded
that the defendant's fundamental right to be tried only when competent
was greater than the state's interests in an efficient judicial process.
Justice Stevens next addressed Oklahoma's argument that it was the
province of the individual state to ordain the laws and procedures by
which its criminal laws are given effect. 189 The Justice stated that in
Patterson v. New York, 1 90 the Court had upheld a state requirement,
defense ....
it would likewise be a reproach to justice and our institutions,
if a human being . . . were compelled to go to trial at a time when he is not
sufficiently in possession of his faculties to enable him to make a rational
and proper defense. The latter would be a more grievous error than the
former; since in one case an individual would go unwhipped of justice,
while in the other the great safeguards which the law adopts in the
punishment of crime and the upholding of justice would be rudely invaded
by the tribunal whose sacred duty it is to uphold the law in all its integrity.
149 F. 284, 288 (S.D. Ala. 1906).
185 Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at 1383 (citing Cruzan v. Director, Mo.
Dep't of Health, 497
U.S. 261, 283 (1990)).
186 Id.
187 See id.
188 See id.
189 See id. Oklahoma argued that "[sitates are free to adopt their own standards of
proof consistent with their own concepts of public policy and fairness." Respondent's
Brief, supra note 38, at *12. The State further posited that because the statutes applicable
to competency determinations vary from state to state, the procedures necessary to protect
due process must also be permitted to vary. See id. at *39. Furthermore, Oklahoma
maintained:
Cases in [the Supreme Court] have long proceeded on the premise that the
Due Process Clause guarantees the fundamental elements of fairness in a
criminal trial ....
But it has never been thought that such cases establish
[the] Court as a rule making organ for the promulgation of state rules of
criminal procedure.
Id. at *40 (quoting Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 70 (1991)).
Even in the rare cases when the Supreme Court has articulated a specific standard of
proof, Oklahoma noted that the Court has held "that determination of the precise
burden ... is a matter of state law properly left to state legislatures and state courts." Id.
at *41 (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769-70 (1982)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
190 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
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consistent with common-law tradition, that placed the burden of proving

an affirmative defense on a defendant charged with murder. 19 The
Justice recognized that while the Patterson Court had upheld the statute
at issue, the Court did so only because the law did not offend "some
principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental." 192 The Court explained that the
Oklahoma statute, unlike its counterpart in Patterson, did offend such a
fundamental principle.1 93 The Justice further distinguished the statutes at
issue in each case,1 94 explaining that the statute in Patterson concerned a
statutory defense, while the Oklahoma statute concerned the procedures
right. 195
by which the state guaranteed a fundamental
Lastly, the Court responded to Oklahoma's final argument, that the
holding of Addington v. Texas, 196 which upheld a clear and convincing
evidence standard in civil commitment proceedings, similarly allowed a
heightened standard in incompetency hearings. 197 First, the Court's
opinion stated that the proceedings in civil commitment hearings and
The
those in competency hearings concern distinct substantive issues.
191 See Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at 1383 (citing Patterson, 432 U.S. at 207-08). The rule in
Patterson was upheld because due process did not "put New York to the choice of
abandoning [statutory] defenses or undertaking to disprove their existence in order to
convict of a crime which otherwise is within its constitutional powers to sanction by
substantial punishment." Patterson, 432 U.S. at 208.
192Id. (quoting Patterson, 432 U.S. at 202) (internal quotation marks omitted).
193 See id.; see also supra notes 134-163 and accompanying text (addressing the
evolution of competency determinations in court proceedings).
194 See Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at 1383.
195 See id.
196 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
197 See Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at 1383-84. "Whether states have adopted their clear and

convincing standards in light of [Addington] is not particularly relevant. What is clear is
that this Court's holding in Addington supports such a standard." Respondent's Brief,
Oklahoma argued that a defendant who could meet the
supra note 38, at *25.
preponderance standard necessary to prevent a criminal trial, but not the clear and
convincing standard necessary for involuntary commitment, "will be in legal limbo." Id.
at *31. The State believed it was contrary to the purpose of incompetency determinations
when "[aibsent a finding of dangerousness, by clear and convincing evidence, the State is
powerless to protect its citizens through either its mental health or judicial processes."
Id.
198 See Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at 1383. The Court has long drawn a distinction between
civil and criminal proceedings and the process requirements that are constitutionally due
in each. See Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 368 (1986) (holding that the "sexually
dangerous persons act" was civil in nature, and that the guarantee against selfincrimination did not apply); see also Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 95 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that "the procedural protections afforded in a criminal
commitment surpass those in a civil commitment; indeed, these procedural protections are
the most stringent known to our law").
Only if a court determines that a penalty imposed on an individual is a criminal one
will the person be entitled to the protections afforded by the Bill of Rights concerning a
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Court explained that the test applied in civil commitment proceedings
concerns whether the person to be committed has a mental illness and
poses a danger to himself or to society. 199 Justice Stevens contrasted this
test with the one used in competency hearings where the court is asked to
determine whether the defendant has the ability to understand the charges
against him and communicate effectively with his counsel. 2 00 As a result
of these differing inquiries, the Justice explained that even by upholding
in the two
the Oklahoma standard, "the comparable standards
20 1
proceedings would not guarantee parallel results."
Furthermore, the Court proffered that the decision in the present
case complemented the ruling in Addington, because both cases
concerned the proper level of protection that a fundamental right warrants
2 2
when a state "proposes to take drastic action against an individual." 0
Justice Stevens explained that the Addington standard safeguards an
individual's fundamental interest in liberty, and the prohibition against a
clear and convincing standard protects
20 3 a defendant's fundamental right
against being tried when incompetent.

criminal prosecution. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 1, § 13.9, at 534 n.1. While
there is no precise standard for determining whether a sanction is criminal or civil, the
court often looks at factors underlying the legislation, such as whether the behavior to
which it applies is a crime itself, legislative history, and the interests promoted by the
penalty. See id. Generally, however, courts must examine the statutes to determine
whether the system imposed is "punitive in nature." See id. Even if the state designates
a system as civil, a statute that clearly imposes a punitive penalty will be deemed
criminal, triggering the protections afforded by the Bill of Rights. See id.
For a general discussion of the distinction between civil and criminal procedures, see
Mary M. Cheb, ConstitutionalLimits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law
Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42
HASTINGS L.J. 1325 (1991); John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the
Criminal and Civil Law Models-And What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875
(1992); Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal
and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795 (1992); Franklin E. Zimring, The Multiple
Middlegrounds Between Civil and CriminalLaw, 101 YALE L.J. 1901 (1992).
199 See Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at 1383 (citing O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563,
573-74 (1975)).

200 See id. at 1384 (citing Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960)); see also
supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text (discussing Dusky).
Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at 1384. "For example, a mentally retarded defendant accused
of a nonviolent crime may be found incompetent to stand trial but not necessarily be
sub* ct to involuntary civil commitment." Id. n.24.
Id. at 1384.
20 See id. The Court noted that Addington did not attempt to determine the rights of a
criminal defendant. See id. n.25 Instead, Justice Stevens explained, the Addington Court
contrasted the situations of a criminal and a civil defendant, because the rules applied in
criminal cases are designed "to exclude as nearly as possible the likelihood of an
erroneous judgment." Id. (quoting Addington, 441 U.S. at 423) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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As a result of finding that the Oklahoma standard did not properly
safeguard Cooper's fundamental right to be free from trial when
incompetent, 204 the Court struck down the statute and reversed and
remanded Cooper's case to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals.2 °5
Since the initial formulation of the Dusky incompetency standard in
1960, the Supreme Court has had multiple opportunities to clarify the
procedures necessary to fully guarantee a defendant's due process rights
in this area.20 6 These cases have been vital to protecting defendants'
constitutional rights, and the Court's decision in Cooper further meets
this goal; the decision is also surprising, however, considering the recent
Court trend towards withdrawing itself from criminal law, 20 7 typically
considered the province of the states. 208
The Cooper decision also stands in stark contrast to other court
decisions regarding the mental state of criminal defendants, most notably
For an in-depth analysis of the Cooper decision, see supra notes 118-203 and
accompanying text.
205 See Cooper, 116 S. Ct. at 1384. On remand, Cooper argued that the Supreme
Court's disposition of the case left "no other option than to remand his case for retrial."
Cooper v. State, 924 P.2d 749, 749-50 (Okla. Crim. App. 1996). Yet the Court of
Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma refused to remand automatically for a new trial, see id.
The court instead ordered the lower court to
determine the feasibility of conducting an appropriate post-examination
competency hearing; and if such a hearing is feasible, to conduct the
hearing to determine whether the defendant was competent to stand trial at
the time his trial was held, using a constitutionally approved standard of
preponderance of the evidence.
Cooper v. State, 924 P.2d 751, 752 (Okla. Crim. App. 1996). Finally, the Court of
Criminal Appeals instructed the trial court to grant Cooper a new trial because it was
determined that a "post-examination competency hearing... would not be feasible."
Comer v. State, 924 P.2d 753, 753 (Okla. Crim. App. 1996).
See generally Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993); Medina v. California, 505
U.S. 437 (1992); Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S.
375 (1966). For an in-depth examination of these cases, see supra notes 60-115 and
accompanying text.
207 See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994-96 (1991) (holding that
a
mandatory life sentence for possession of 650 grams or more of drugs does not violate
the Eighth Amendment).
208 See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 636 (1991). Justice Marshall noted that
'enforcement of criminal laws is indeed a legitimate goal, but in our system achievement
of that goal is left primarily to the States." United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 759
n.4 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Furthermore, Justice Black once commented that a
true system of federalism entails:
a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire
country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a
continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the
States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions
in separate ways.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
204
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9
the limitations allowed on the "not guilty by reason of insanity" 20

defense. States, responding to public outcry over the "abuse" of the
insanity defense, have increasingly attempted to either limit the defense
or abolish it altogether.21 0 Yet the Supreme Court in Cooper, in effect,

further distinguished an incompetency determination from an insanity
defense,2 1 implicitly recognizing the distinct due process issues raised in
each. The Court's discussion, beginning with Dusky and continuing
through Cooper, has led to substantial uniformity among the states
regarding the procedures governing incompetency determinations, unlike
the varying standards applied in jurisdictions concerning the insanity
defense.
Simply, the Court has increasingly narrowed the ability of
the states to prescribe differing procedures, ranging from the substantive
standards to be applied 21321to the procedural protections required.21 4
In conclusion, the Court's decision in Cooper correctly stands in the
way of a public whose intensifying hatred of criminals 215 drives state and
federal legislatures to pass increasingly restrictive criminal laws, such as
community notification laws, or so-called "Megan's Laws." 2 16 Yet,
209 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 794 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "insanity" as
"that degree
of mental illness which negates the individual's legal responsibility or capacity").
210 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-207(1) (Supp. 1996) (abolishing the insanity defense in
criminal trials). Idaho courts have upheld this abolition as constitutional. See State v.
Odiaga, 871 P.2d 801, 805 (Idaho 1994). Many other courts and commentators have
similarly called for the abolition of the insanity defense in other jurisdictions. See, e.g.,
Washington v. United States, 390 F.2d 444, 457 n.33 (D.C. Cir. 1967) ("W~e may be
forced to eliminate the insanity defense altogether, or refashion it in a way which is not
tied so tightly to the medical model.").
211 See ROBINSON, supra note 12, § 208(a), at 501 (stating that the
insanity defense
"considers the defendant's mental capacity at the time of the offense and serves to fully
exculpate the defendant for his conduct" while an incompetency finding serves "simply to
bar his trial").
212 Compare State v. Harris, 141 N.J. 525, 552, 662 A.2d 333, 346
(1995) (applying
M'Naghten rules to the insanity defense in state proceedings) with United States v.
Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (adopting the American Law Institute's
rules regarding the insanity defense in federal proceedings).
213 See generally Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam).
214 See generally Cooper v. Oklahoma, 116 S. Ct. 1373 (1996); Godinez v. Moran,
509 U.S. 389 (1993); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
215 See, e.g., Peter Davis, The Sex Offender Next Door, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 28,
1996, at 43 (noting a released sex offender "could not be more of an outcast if he were a

leper").

216 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 42-9-44.1 (1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:546(A)

(West Supp. 1997); MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-33-17 & -19 (Supp. 1995); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-32-15 (Supp. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-106 (Supp. 1996). Megan's Laws
became part of the national consciousness in 1994 as a result of the sexual assault and
murder of seven-year-old Megan Kanka in New Jersey.
See Elga A. Goodman,
Comment, Megan's Law: The New Jersey Supreme Court Navigates Uncharted Waters,
26 SETON HALL L. REV. 764, 764 (1996). The public outcry against sex offenders has
also prompted federal legislation, and in 1994, Congress passed its own version of
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NOTE

whether Cooper is a complete roadblock, rather than a temporary speed
bump, remains to be seen.
Mark A. Sblendorio*

Megan's Law. See 42 U.S.C. § 14071(b)(1)(A)(1) (1994) (providing a duty of sexual
predators to register with local law enforcement authorities). In May 1996, President
Clinton vowed to fight to uphold such statutes "all the way to the Supreme Court,"
noting, in a statement eerily reminiscent of the vengeful cowboys of the Old West, that
"there is no greater right than a parent's right to raise a child in safety and love. Today,
America warns: If you dare to prey on our children, the law will follow you wherever
you go, State to State, town to town." Remarks on Signing Megan's Law and Exchange
with Reporters, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 878 (May 17, 1996).
New Jersey's statute, passed in 1994, is typical of Megan's Laws around the
country. See Goodman, supra, at 765 (noting that "New Jersey's response to the danger
posed by violent sexual offenders is not entirely novel"). The principal elements of these
bills provide for registration of sex offenders and community notification upon the
offenders' release from incarceration. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1 to -11 (West 1995).
The constitutionality of New Jersey's Megan's Law, and by implication other states' laws
as well, is currently a subject of heated debate. Compare Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 11011, 662 A.2d 367, 422-23 (1995) (upholding New Jersey's Megan's Law) with Artway v.
Attorney Gen., 876 F. Supp. 666, 692 (D.N.J. 1995) (striking down New Jersey's
Megan's Law as unconstitutional) affid in part, vacated in part, 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir.)
reh'g denied, 83 F.3d 594 (3d Cir. 1996). For an in-depth discussion of New Jersey's
Megan's Law, see generally Goodman, supra.
The author can be reached via the Internet at SAGET@BIOFOOT.COM.

